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This case note reflects on the approach that should be adopted by sentencing courts when imposing sentences 
on child offenders who turn 18 during proceedings. The Western Cape High Court recently considered the 
application of the sentencing principles in the Child Justice Act and section 28 of the Constitution to child 
offenders who turn 18 prior to their sentencing. The court confirmed that there is ‘no arbitrary end to childhood 
for children who have committed offences before they attained the age of adulthood’ and concluded that the 
sentencing principles in the Child Justice Act are applicable to children who turn 18 prior to sentencing.
It is established law that child offenders should be 
afforded special treatment and given sentences that 
are more lenient than those imposed on adults.1 The 
Constitutional Court has embedded child-centred 
sentencing principles through its judgements by 
applying section 28 of the Constitution to child 
offenders.2 In particular, the Constitutional Court has 
emphasised the importance of applying section 28(2), 
which provides that the best interests of the child 
are paramount in every matter concerning them and 
section 28(1)(g), which states that children should not 
be imprisoned except as a measure of last resort. 
South Africa is also signatory to international and 
regional instruments providing for the protection 
of child offenders’ rights.3 The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child4 (the CRC) 
makes it clear in Article 3 that ‘in all actions 
concerning children, whether undertaken by public 
or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, 
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, 
the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration’. Article 37 of the CRC provides, inter 
alia, that arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child 
should be used as a measure of last resort and 
should be for the shortest appropriate period of time. 
Article 40 encourages states parties to, inter alia, 
treat child offenders in a manner that promotes their 
sense of dignity and worth, reinforces their respect 
for human rights and the fundamental freedoms of 
others, and takes into account the age of the child 
offender and the promotion of their reintegration 
and ability to play a constructive role in society. 
Articles 4 and 17 of the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) provide similar 
protections to children in conflict with the law.5
The Child Justice Act of 20086 (Act 75 of 2008, ‘the 
CJA’) was introduced to give effect to the principles in 
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the Constitution and to domesticate the international 
law relating to child offenders. The preamble of the 
CJA states that the purpose of the CJA is to establish 
a criminal justice system for children in conflict 
with the law, based on the values underpinning 
the Constitution. In his judgement in S v CKM and 
others,7 Judge Bertelsmann described the CJA’s 
basic tenets in the following manner:
[The CJA] represents a decisive break with the 
traditional criminal justice system. The traditional 
pillars of punishment, retribution and deterrence 
are replaced with emphasis on the need to gain 
understanding of a child caught up in behaviour 
transgressing the law by assessing her or his 
personality, determining whether the child is in 
need of care, and correcting errant actions as 
far as possible by diversion, community based 
programmes, the application of restorative-
justice processes and reintegration of the child 
into the community.
The CJA embraces a wide range of appropriate 
sentencing options specifically designed to suit 
the needs of children while ensuring that they 
acknowledge responsibility and accountability for 
crimes committed.8 Section 69(1) of the CJA states 
that the objectives of sentencing are to encourage 
the child to understand the implications of his or her 
actions and be accountable for the harm caused, as 
well as to promote an individualised response that 
strikes a balance between the circumstances of the 
child, the nature of the offence and the interests of 
society. The CJA also promotes the reintegration of 
the child into the family and community, and ensures 
that any necessary supervision, guidance, treatment 
or services contained in the sentence assist the 
child in the process of reintegration. Lastly, the CJA 
promotes the use of imprisonment only as a measure 
of last resort and only for the shortest appropriate 
period of time.
In light of the above constitutional, international and 
legislative injunctions, this case note will consider 
the recent judgement of S v SN unreported, case no 
141114/14 (WCC). The Western Cape High Court 
had to decide whether the above principles were 
applicable in the sentencing of persons who commit 
offences as children and become adults during child 
justice court procedures.  
A brief background
The matter concerned the sentencing of two young 
men who were 17 when they fatally stabbed a pupil 
at their school.9 They both pleaded guilty in terms 
of section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 
1977 (Act 51 of 1977) and entered their guilty plea 
statements setting out their version of the events 
that led to the stabbing.10 They were convicted of 
murder by a Child Justice Court.11 The two accused 
were born two days apart in December 1995.12 They 
committed the offence on 3 October 2013 and were 
arrested on the same day.13 
Both offenders were sentenced to 10 years’ direct 
imprisonment. The matter came before the Western 
Cape High Court on automatic review in terms 
of section 85 of the act.14 Section 85 provides 
that if a child has been sentenced to any form of 
imprisonment15 the sentence is subject to review by a 
Judge of the High Court, having jurisdiction.16 
On perusal of the record, the High Court was 
concerned that the presiding magistrate did not 
seem cognisant of the fact that the two accused 
qualified to be treated as children for sentencing 
purposes, even though he was fully aware of 
the fact that he was presiding in a Child Justice 
Court.17 The High Court was also concerned about 
the inconsistencies between the facts set out in 
Section 112 guilty plea statements, and the facts 
described by the Child Justice Court magistrate 
while considering the appropriate sentences.18 The 
magistrate elected to rely on the version of the facts 
set out in the probation officers’ report, rather than 
on the version provided by the accused in their plea 
statements. The High Court addressed queries to the 
magistrate on the following concerns:
•	On	what	basis	did	the	magistrate	use	the	facts	
provided by the probation officers for purposes 
of sentencing when they clearly contradicted and 
went beyond the facts accepted on record in terms 
of the plea statements?19
•	 To	what	extent,	if	any,	did	the	court	apply	section	
28(1)(g)20 and section 28(2)21 of the Constitution 
during sentencing?22 
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This article will limit its focus to the findings of the 
court in respect of the second question, with the 
aim to contribute to discussions on the judicial 
application of the CJA, particularly on the issue of 
sentencing in terms of the CJA.
The magistrate’s responses and the High Court’s 
findings will be dealt with in the discussion on the 
High Court’s decision below. 
Judgement of the High Court
The magistrate’s response to the second question 
was to point out that both the accused turned 18 
before they were sentenced.23 In terms of section 
28(3) of the Constitution, a child is a person below 
the age of 18 years of age. Therefore, the magistrate 
had concluded that section 28(1)(g) and section 
28(2) were not applicable in this matter.24
The High Court rejected this reasoning and was of 
the view that the accused qualified to be dealt with 
in terms of the CJA because they were under the 
age of 18 when they were arrested. The court began 
its discussion on why it rejected the magistrate’s 
reasoning by firstly affirming the importance of 
treating children differently from adults during 
sentencing. The court reiterated the principles 
set out in the Constitutional Court case of Centre 
for Child Law v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development:
In Centre for Child Law, Cameron J, writing 
for the majority, explained [section 28(2)] in the 
context of sentencing child offenders, stating 
‘the constitutional injunction that “[a] child’s 
best interests are of paramount importance 
in every matter concerning the child” does 
not preclude sending child offenders to jail. 
It means that the child’s interests are “more 
important than anything else”, but not that 
everything else is unimportant; the entire 
spectrum of considerations relating to the 
child offender, the offence and the interests of 
society may require incarceration as the last 
resort of punishment’. 
The two fundamental issues at stake were the child’s 
right to have his or her best interests considered 
paramount, and the right not to be detained except 
as a measure of last resort and for the shortest 
appropriate period of time.26 In addition, Cameron 
stated that children are accorded different treatment 
during sentencing because they are less morally 
capable than adults in their ill-considered actions but 
more capable of rehabilitation.27 This was restated 
by Skweyiya in the Constitutional Court case of 
Mpofu v Minister for Justice and Constitutional 
Development and Others, where he said that:
Section 28 of the Constitution demands that 
children are accorded different treatment 
in sentencing. A failure to do so is a 
constitutional failure.28 
The High Court then went on to discuss the CJA’s 
definition of a child and why the above principles 
on treating children differently should be applied to 
the offenders in the case before it. The court noted 
that the CJA defines a child as a person below the 
age of 18 years and purposively extends, in certain 
circumstances, the meaning to include a person 
who is 18 or older but under the age of 21 years, 
whose matter is dealt with in terms of section 4(2).29 
Section 4(2) sets out the jurisdiction of the director 
of public prosecutions to deal with matters under 
the CJA, and includes a person who:
•	 Is	alleged	to	have	committed	an	offence	when	he	
or she was under the age of 18 years 
•	 Is	18	years	or	older	but	under	the	age	of	21	years,	
at the time referred to in subsection (1)(b)
Section 4(1)(b) provides that a child will fall under 
the provisions of the CJA if the child was between 
the ages of 10 and 18 when the child was handed a 
written notice, served with a summons, or arrested. 
Section 4(1) confirms that the important age to be 
considered is the age at the time of the offence and 
the institution of criminal proceedings.30 This takes 
into account the fact that offenders who commit 
crimes when they are children will not always be 
children when they are in the child justice court for 
trial and sentencing, due to systemic problems such 
as delays and challenges related to the laying of 
charges, the apprehension of the offender and, quite 
simply, the inertia of the criminal justice system.31 
Such delays and inefficiencies in the system should 
not prejudice a child and cause them to lose the 
protection provided by the CJA.32
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Section 4(2)(b) permits prosecution to be initiated in 
terms of the CJA against an offender who is older 
than 18 but under the age of 21. However, this only 
happens in certain circumstances as set out in the 
national director of public prosecutions directives.33 
These include, inter alia, if the offence is a schedule 1 
offence; if the co-accused is a child; if there is doubt 
about the accused’s age; and if the accused appears 
to be intellectually or developmentally challenged.34 
This provision was included to give the prosecution 
more flexibility in the exercise of its powers.35 The 
provision also envisions the possibility that there 
could be occasions where an offender has just 
turned 18, is still attending school, and could benefit 
from diversion as set out in the act.36 Lastly, the 
provision also takes into account that if there is more 
than one accused in an offence, it would be ‘artificial 
to separate the cases of one or two who are slightly 
older from those of their contemporaries’.37   
The court in this case found that the two accused 
qualified to be dealt with in terms of the CJA due to 
the fact that they were below the age of 18 when 
they were arrested, and therefore fell under the 
purview of section 4(1).38 
The High Court goes on to point out that the 
above sections of the CJA confirm that there is 
‘no arbitrary end to childhood for children who 
have committed offences before they attained the 
age of adulthood, but are still being processed 
through the criminal justice system when they 
turn 18’.39 In this way the CJA promotes the spirit, 
purport and objects of sections 28(1) and (2) of the 
Constitution,40 and avoids a ‘misguidedly narrow 
application of the definition [of a child] in section 
28(3)’ of the Constitution.41 Furthermore, this 
approach to sentencing of a child who turns 18 
during proceedings would be in accordance with the 
Constitutional Court application of section 28(1)(g) in 
Centre for Child Law and Mpofu:
When a person commits an offence while 
under the age of 18, their conduct falls to be 
judged in the context of these considerations. 
It would make no sense then to treat them 
as adults for sentencing purposes simply 
because the intervening passage of time has 
resulted in their being adults when sentencing 
occurs. That would mean punishing them for 
what they had done as children as if it had 
been done when they were adults. That such 
an approach would impinge on the substance 
of the rights provided in terms of [section] 28 
of the Constitution is axiomatic …42 
This approach is further affirmed by the United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing 
Rules),43 which encourage the application of 
principles embodied in the rules to young adult 
offenders.44 In its discussion of the Beijing Rules, 
the commentary to the European Rules for juvenile 
offenders subject to sanctions or measures 
acknowledges the fact that ‘young adults in general 
are in a transitional stage of life, which can justify 
their being dealt with by the juvenile justice agencies 
and juvenile courts’.45 The Recommendation 
Rec(2003)20 by the Council of Europe Committee of 
Ministers46 notes the following:
Reflecting the extended transition to adulthood, 
it should be possible for young adults under the 
age of 21 to be treated in a way comparable 
to juveniles and to be subject to the same 
interventions, when the judge is of the opinion 
that they are not as mature and responsible for 
their actions as full adults. 
The High Court concluded that the magistrate’s 
reasoning during sentencing was based on a 
fundamentally misdirected understanding of the 
ambit of section 28(1)(g) of the Constitution.47 The 
magistrate had treated the accused as youthful adult 
offenders and not as people who had committed the 
offence when they were children.48 The High Court 
noted that the accused were placed ‘on the wrong 
side of the “stark but beneficial distinction between 
adults and children” created in terms of [section] 
28 of the Bill of Rights, and thus approached 
the determination of their punishment on the 
incorrect assumption that [section] 28(1)(g) was not 
applicable’.49 This misdirection led to the failure of 
the magistrate to consider all the appropriate 
sentencing options, including compulsory residence 
in a child and youth care centre, in terms of section 
76 of the act.50
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The order given by the High Court
In view of its findings, the court in S v SN made the 
following order:51
•	 The	sentences	of	the	accused	were	set	aside,	
which meant that the magistrate’s sentence 
 to direct imprisonment no longer applied to 
 the accused.
•	 The	matter	was	referred	back	to	the	trial	court	for	
the urgent consideration of the sentence afresh 
before a different magistrate.
•	 The	new	sentencing	magistrate	had	to	take	into	
account the guidance given in the High Court’s 
judgement in respect of the sentencing principles 
that apply to children.
•	 The	new	sentencing	magistrate	could	only	
sentence the accused after hearing the oral 
evidence from the probation officers and other 
relevant witnesses.
•	 The	High	Court	included	the	additional	
 safeguard that the matter had to be resubmitted  
for review by the High Court after the new  
sentence was imposed.
It is important to note that, in reaching its decision, 
the High Court was concerned that the magistrate, 
in his misdirected understanding of section 28, did 
not consider sentencing the accused to compulsory 
residence in a child and youth care centre (CYCC) in 
terms of section 76 of the CJA.52 The court was of 
the opinion that this alone necessitated the setting 
aside of the sentence.53 
It is interesting to note that the North Gauteng 
High Court had to consider a case in which an 
offender who had turned 18 was sentenced to a 
CYCC. This case will be discussed below to 
highlight the importance of this sentencing option in 
such circumstances. 
Approach of the North Gauteng High 
Court in a similar matter
The approach of the Western Cape High Court 
corresponds with that of the North Gauteng High 
Court when considering whether a sentence of 
compulsory residence in a child and youth care 
centre can be applied after an offender has turned 18 
years old. The matter of S v Melapi 54 came before 
the North Gauteng High Court by way of review. 
The accused in question was 17 years old when 
he was charged with murder.55 He was convicted 
on 28 January 2013, when he was 18 years old.56 
The magistrate hearing the matter indicated that he 
wanted to impose a sentence of detention in a child 
and youth care centre in terms of section 76 of the 
CJA.57 However, the centre concerned refused to 
accept the placement of the child because he was 
18 years old.58 
Although the North Gauteng High Court ultimately 
found that detention was not an appropriate 
sentence for the accused, it also found that it was 
important to deal with the question of whether a 
sentence of compulsory residence in a child and 
youth care centre could be applied after an offender 
turned 18.59 
At the outset, Judge Tolmay pointed out that section 
4(1) of the CJA needs to be read with section 76, in 
particular section 76(2), of the CJA, which deals with 
the sentence of compulsory residence in a child and 
youth care centre.60 Section 76(1) and (2) state that:
•	 A	child	justice	court	that	convicts	a	child	of	an	
offence may sentence him or her to compulsory 
residence in a child and youth care centre that 
provides a programme referred to in section 191 
(2) (j) of the Children’s Act.
•	 A	sentence	referred	to	in	subsection	(1)	may,	
subject to subsection (3), be imposed for a period 
not exceeding five years, or for a period which 
may not exceed the date on which the child in 
question turns 21 years of age, whichever date is 
the earliest.
Section 76(2) allows young offenders who have 
been sentenced to CYCCs for serious crimes to 
remain at the centres until they turn 21. This allows 
for custodial sentences to be imposed without the 
risk of exposing the young offenders to prison.61 This 
promotes the principles that apply to sentencing of 
young offenders.62  
Tolmay held that a proper interpretation of the law 
must promote the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights.63 An interpretation of law that is 
constitutionally compliant must be selected over one 
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that is not.64 An interpretation of the CJA must be 
one that takes into consideration the best interests 
of a child.65 Tolmay found that reference to ‘child’ in 
section 76(1) (read with section 4(1)), must be read 
in a manner that includes persons over 18 years or 
older but under 21 years at the time of sentencing.66 
This interpretation applies only if the person 
concerned was under 18 at the time of the offence, 
arrest and issuing of written notice or summons.67 
The court invited the Centre for Child Law to 
make submissions as amicus curiae.68 The amicus 
submitted that in terms of the principle of legality 
everyone has the right to benefit from the least severe 
prescribed punishment if it changed from the time the 
offence was committed and the time of sentencing.69 
The CJA requires a less onerous sentencing regime 
to be applied to children than that of the regime 
applicable to adult offenders.70 A child is advised 
and assisted by his legal representative, based on 
the sentencing principles in the CJA.71 The passage 
of time should not render the child liable to a more 
onerous sentencing regime than he is given to expect 
at the start of his case.72 
The CJA was enacted to give effect to the principles 
that apply to children who come into contact with the 
criminal justice system, and in particular to recognise 
the vulnerabilities and special needs of children 
throughout their interaction with the criminal justice 
system, including during sentencing.73 The application 
of a more onerous sentencing regime after the child 
turns 18 goes against the objects and purpose of 
the CJA,74 as sentencing options under the CJA will 
no longer be available. This prevents the court from 
applying sentencing options such as diversion and 
restorative justice forums that may be more beneficial 
for the successful rehabilitation of the child offender.75
The amicus submitted that the CJA should be 
applied in a manner that observes the principle of 
legality, which directs that a child who turns 18 during 
the course of proceedings should still be treated as 
a child until the case is concluded.76 This takes into 
account the fact that the best interests of children 
have been at play since the commencement of the 
proceedings.77 Other courts have acknowledged 
that children who turn 18 during the course of 
proceedings do not lose the protections granted to 
them as children.78 The amicus made reference to 
the case of S v IO,79 in which the court anonymised 
the name of an accused who had turned 18.80 The 
court also interfered with his sentence on appeal 
because he was a child at the time of commission of 
the offences.81 The following reason was given by the 
court in S v IO:
It appears from a careful perusal of the learned 
trial judge’s judgment on sentence that there 
is absolutely no reference therein to the 
imperative provisions of s 28 of the Constitution. 
Nor is there any trace therein of an informed 
and nuanced weighing of all the interlinking 
factors of relevance to the sentencing process, 
and indicative of a changed judicial mindset 
consonant with an awareness of the Constitution 
regarding the sentencing of juveniles.82 
Tolmay concluded that the reference to a child in 
section 76(1) must be read in a manner that includes 
persons 18 or older but under 21 years old at the time 
of sentence, as long as the person was under the 
age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the 
offence, and at the time of arrest or of the issuing of a 
written notice or summons as set out in section 4(1).83 
The interpretation that the sentencing provisions in the 
Act do not apply to a person who turns 18 during the 
course of proceedings, would be untenable.84 It would 
result in a child who committed an offence while still a 
minor, being sentenced as an adult.85 
Tolmay confirmed that section 76 is a competent 
sentence for an offender who turns 18 during the 
course of proceedings but is under the age of 21, 
listing the following reasons:86
•	 To	conclude	that	a	child	is	a	person	who	is	under	18	
years old during the entire course of the proceedings 
would cause section 4(1) of the CJA to be futile
•	 It	would	also	lead	to	an	irregular	situation	in	which,	
on the one hand, a child who turns 18 during 
the course of proceedings is stripped of all legal 
protection, and, on the other hand, protection is 
provided to a person who qualifies as a child in 
terms of section 4(2)
•	Making	the	date	of	conviction	the	relevant	date	
when determining a sentence for a child deviates 
from the principle expressed by the Constitutional 
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Court in Mpofu. The Constitutional Court held that 
the relevant date for purposes of sentencing is the 
date of the commission of the offence
•	 Legislation	must	be	interpreted	in	accordance	
 with the Constitution, as required by section 39(2) 
of the Constitution
Conclusion
It is the opinion of the authors that the decisions 
reached by the high courts in S v SN and S v Melapi 
conform with section 28(1)(g) and section 28(2) of 
the Constitution and with the objectives of the Child 
Justice Act. In confirming that the age at time of 
the commission of the offence is the relevant age 
for determining an appropriate sentence, the courts 
have set a precedent that we hope will be followed in 
future judgements and court orders. It is in this vein 
that Skelton notes the following:87
[J]udges of the future [are] the important upper 
guardians of an effective child system. Their 
vigilance can indeed ensure that children’s 
best interests are protected in the child justice 
system, that detention truly is a measure of last 
resort, and, where unavoidable, that it is for 
the shortest period of time so that every day a 
child spends in prison should be because there 
is no alternative.
It is acknowledged that judicial precedents set by 
high courts only have persuasive value for high courts 
in other jurisdictions. This, however, does not take 
away from the fact that the decisions are in line with 
principles established by the Constitutional Court. 
The two courts especially conformed to the principles 
set out in the Mpofu judgements, where 
the Constitutional Court confirmed that the relevant 
age for sentencing is the age at which the offence 
was committed.88  
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